The proof of Proposition 4 in Hermalin and Katz (1991) is incorrect, because it fails to check post-renegotiation utilities against the incentive compatibility constraints. This note states and proves a comparable proposition with a slightly stronger assumption regarding the monotonicity of bargaining. This result vindicates the central intuition of Hermalin and Katz about the potential insigni…cance of the observable, but unveri…able distinction in contracting.
Introduction
Hermalin and Katz (1991) investigate the outcome of agency games in which the principal observes information about the agent's action that she is unable to verify. Even when critical variables are not veri…able, parties can often present some relevant evidence, and Hermalin and Katz show that such noisy but informative signals can allow parties to write contracts as if the "critical" variables were veri…able. 2 The key is that the parties can renegotiate their contract after the principal observes the observable, but unveri…able information (e.g., the agent's action), but before the realization of the state of the world (e.g., output) upon which the contract is contingent. Indeed, when the agent's action itself is observable, but unveri…able, then the parties can use the initial contract, written contingent on the veri…able outcome, to supply the agent with incentives and, then, renegotiate to eliminate the ine¢cient risk sharing. In this way, the …rst best can be achieved.
Hermalin and Katz establish their results assuming take-it-or-leave-it bargaining in renegotiation. However, because bargaining power is more typically shared, they recognize that their results would have more economic signi…cance if they were extended beyond take-it-or-leave-it bargaining. They attempt such an extension in their Proposition 4. Unfortunately, their proof is wrong because it does not properly fold the renegotiation outcomes back into the incentive-compatibility constraints. 3 Here, we provide a correct proof of essentially the same proposition. Our proposition imposes only a slightly stronger monotonicity assumption; requiring that, as the agent's expected wage under the initial contract increases, his renegotiated wage increases at a rate bounded from zero.
Model
A principal employs an agent to take an action a chosen from A, a …nite subset of R. The principal observes this action, but it is not veri…able. After the principal observes the agent's action, the parties can renegotiate the contract. Ultimately, a veri…able signal x 2 X is realized. Let G (¢ja) be a probability measure conditional on a that maps some ¾-algebra of X into R. A contract is a mapping from the signal to wages: w : X ! R. The initial contract remains in force unless renegotiated.
The …rst-best action maximizes the principal's expected utility subject to the constraint that the agent receive at least his reservation utility, which we normalize to 0. This constraint must bind; hence, this program reduces to
3 Since we …rst drafted this paper, Ishiguro (1998) has independently found that the proof of Hermalin and Katz's Proposition 4 is wrong. He does not, however, comment on whether the Proposition itself could be correct. For a speci…c example, he shows that the …rst best can be achieved for …xed-shares bargaining. 4 Hermalin and Katz assume the utility function is u (y)¡c (a); but, there is no loss of generality in letting c (a)´a.
We assume that this program has a unique solution, a ¤ . So that the agency problem is meaningful, assume this action is not a least-cost action for the agent; that is, a ¤ > min A.
Analysis
The solution to the agency problem absent renegotiation typically involves compensation contingent on the signal, x. This will fail to achieve the …rst best, however, because the risk-averse agent bears risk in equilibrium. Renegotiation can improve the allocation of risk by shifting it from the agent to the risk-neutral principal; that is, by renegotiating a contingent-wage contract into a ‡at-wage contract after the agent has acted. Moreover, since that ‡at wage depends on what would have happened under the initial contingent contract given the agent's action, the agent will, therefore, still have incentives to work hard. In fact, as Hermalin and Katz (1991) showed, if we assume extreme bargaining power in the renegotiation game, then the …rst best is attainable.
Here we extend the result to "intermediate" bargaining. Following Hermalin and Katz, we assume that the bargaining outcome is unique and entirely determined by the agent's expected utilityũ exclusive of action costs and the principal's expected wage paymentw should the initial contract remain in force. In particular, we assume that bargaining results in the original contingent contract being replaced with a nonrandom payment by the principal to the agent in the amount of h (ũ;w), thereby yielding the agent a certain utility of u [h (ũ;w)]. We assume, moreover, that h satis…es the following properties:
Individual rationality: u [h(ũ;w)]¸ũ and h(ũ;w) ·w for allũ,w.
Uniform monotonicity: h 1 (ũ;w)¸0 and h 2 (ũ;w) >´> 0, for some´> 0 for allũ;w.
Observe that individually rational bargaining satis…es h £ũ ; u ¡1 (ũ) ¤ = u ¡1 (ũ) for allũ. Observe also that both properties are satis…ed by any constant-shares bargaining game over the surplus,
For individually-rational uniformly-monotonic bargaining games, we can establish su¢cient conditions for the …rst best to be attainable.
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Proposition 1: Suppose that:
(i) the principal's payment from the renegotiation bargaining game is uniquely given by h(u; w), where u and w are the agent's expected utility (exclusive of action costs) and the principal's expected wage payment, respectively, should the initial contract remain in force, and h satis…es both individual rationality and uniform monotonicity; and
then action a ¤ is implementable at …rst-best cost with renegotiation.
Proof: De…ne ¹ ¼ (a)´G (X ¤ ja) and consider the contract
After the agent chooses a, the parties will renegotiate. By assumption, the agent's resulting utility is u hĥ (w 1 ; w 2 ; ¹ ¼(a)) i : A contract implements a ¤ at …rst-best cost with renegotiation if and
Observe that, using (1), these expressions can be rewritten aŝ
De…ne w ¤ 2 (¢) so that hw 1 ; w ¤ 2 (w 1 )i satis…es (2) for all w 1 . To see that w ¤ 2 (¢) is well-de…ned, observe, …rst, thatĥ has positive …rst derivatives with respect to both w 1 and w 2 . Moreover, the individual rationality of bargaining implies that
satis…es (2), because h(a ¤ ; u ¡1 (a ¤ )) = u ¡1 (a ¤ ): These observations together imply that w ¤ 2 (¢) indeed exists and, moreover, is decreasing and continuous. Note that for w 1 > u ¡1 (a ¤ ), w ¤ 2 (w 1 ) < w 1 . Henceforth, we will consider only w 1 > u ¡1 (a ¤ ).
Observe that
Invoking uniform monotonicity, we have
for all ¹ ¼ and w 1 > w ¤ 2 (w 1 ). Combining the mean value theorem with inequality (4), yieldŝ
for all a. Since A is …nite, we can de…neâ = arg min
for all a 6 = a ¤ . Because w ¤ 2 (¢) is a continuous and decreasing function and
, we can …nd a w ¤ 1 su¢ciently large that the right-hand side of (5) exceeds u ¡1 (a ¤ ) ¡ u ¡1 (a), where a´min A.
Transitivity then yieldŝ
for all a 6 = a ¤ . Hence, (3) holds. By construction, (1) holds. Therefore, the contract paying
There are three main di¤erences between this proposition and the one Hermalin and Katz state. First, we introduce individual rationality, an innocuous restriction that might be viewed as implicit in Hermalin and Katz's statement. Second, our proof requires the stronger monotonicity assumption that h 2 >´> 0, whereas Hermalin and Katz assume that h 2 > 0 and that h goes to in…nity as expected wages approach in…nity. We do not know if the proposition holds without uniform monotonicity. Third, we state the proposition in terms of the principal's post-renegotiation payment instead of the agent's post-renegotiation utility; this formulation allows us to impose uniform monotonicity in a way that is satis…ed by constant-shares bargaining.
Our proof is intuitively understood by considering an initial contract that pays the agent w 1 if x 2 X ¤ and w 2 if x = 2 X ¤ . As the agent switches from a to a ¤ he raises the probability that
. This increases the amount the principal is willing to pay the agent to buy out the contract at a rate of w 1 ¡ w 2 : The agent's bargaining fall-back (i.e., his certainty equivalent) also improves, but-even ignoring this-the agent receives at least a share´of the principal's extra willingness to pay under uniformly monotonic sharing. Hence, by driving the wedge w 1 ¡ w 2 su¢ciently large (while maintaining the agent's participation constraint), we can induce an arbitrarily large post-renegotiation pay di¤erence between actions a ¤ and a.
Finally, we should point out two potential limitations and one extension of this analysis. First, there is an implicit assumption in the above bargaining game that the outcome will be independent of bygone actions. To illustrate why this matters and why e¢ciency is not obtainable for all bargaining games, assume u (y) = ln (y), A = f0; 1g, and two possible signals, x 1 and x 2 . Let the probability of x 1 given a be a+2 4
. Suppose that a ¤ = 1 is the …rst-best action. It is implementable without renegotiation by Hermalin and Katz's Proposition 2. Suppose that the harder the agent works, the less energy he has for bargaining, so that the principal has all the bargaining power when a = 1, but no bargaining power when a = 0. Let U a (w 1 ; w 2 ) be the equilibrium utility of the agent conditional on a and the contract w i = w (x i ). Then, U 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = 3 4 ln (w 1 ) + 1 4 ln (w 2 ) ¡ 1 and U 0 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = ln ¡ 1 2 w 1 + 1 2 w 2 ¢ . The …rst-best action a = 1 is not implementable with this bargaining game, because there exist no w 1 and w 2 such that U 1 (w 1 ; w 2 )¸U 0 (w 1 ; w 2 ).
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To be sure, we are not suggesting this bargaining game is more reasonable than the one considered above; its purpose is simply to demonstrate that some constraints on the bargaining game are necessary for e¢ciency. A second potential limitation is the model's realism when the signals (i.e., the x 's) are relatively uninformative: The resulting large spread between the wages w 1 & w 2 increases the amount at stake in renegotiation, which could raise doubts about our assumption of e¢cient bargaining; and it could result in w 2 ¿ 0, which courts might interpret as an invalid penalty. Lastly, we note that an earlier version of this paper (Edlin and Hermalin, 1997) extended the analysis to 6 Maximizing U1 (w1; w2) ¡ U0 (w1; w2) with respect to w1 and w2 reveals that any w1 and w2 pair on the line w 1 = 3w 2 is optimal. When w 1 = 3w 2 , U 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) ¡ U 0 (w 1 ; w 2 ) reduces to ln ³ 3 3=4 =2´¡ 1; which is negative.
